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 The role the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) played in the Cuban missile crisis offers a significant historical lesson on the primacy of defining political objectives 
over pursuing an expedient military solution� The recommendations the JCS 
provided to the president were consistent with decades of military experience, 
as well as doctrine designed to keep the Soviets in check through deterrence, but 
President John F� Kennedy did not take those recommendations, and the crisis 
was resolved by other means�
Following the Cuban missile crisis, General Thomas S� Power, the commander 
of Strategic Air Command (SAC), cited SAC’s overwhelming nuclear deterrent as 
the reason President Kennedy was able to achieve a diplomatic solution to the cri-
sis�1 During the crisis, SAC stood an airborne nuclear alert, conventional forces 
massed in the southeastern United States to prepare for an invasion, and the 
U�S� Navy carried out a blockade� On October 19, 
1962, the chiefs disagreed with the president’s as-
sessment of Soviet premier Nikita S� Khrushchev’s 
next move and recommended that the president 
respond with an air strike�
That would have been an appropriate military 
response, one in line with White House policy 
and Department of Defense plans� The JCS rec-
ommendation of an air strike against Cuba as the 
solution—to accomplish the removal of the Soviet 
medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs)—was 
the logical result of decades of planning and Air 
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Force operations� Furthermore, the military’s Operational Plans (OPLANs) 312, 
314, and 316 and the initial actions the JCS took were aligned with the Kennedy ad-
ministration’s Cuba policies following the Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961� From 
October 15 to 24, 1962, the JCS pressed military planning and deployments that 
placed U�S� nuclear forces at their highest state of readiness during the Cold War�
President Kennedy ultimately pursued a course that was at variance with the 
initial military recommendations from the JCS� Yes, nuclear and conventional 
deterrence were keys to resolving the Cuban missile crisis, but it was avoiding 
a confrontation that would have required Khrushchev and Kennedy to make a 
full conventional or nuclear response that provided the balance that allowed the 
crisis to be resolved�
Having dutifully advised the president over the course of the Cuban missile 
crisis, including disagreeing as appropriate, the JCS—particularly the Air Force 
and Navy chiefs—then faithfully executed the president’s direction� This offers 
a narrative of the crisis that is far more nuanced than a simplistic hawks-versus-
doves interpretation�
This article relies on military command histories, declassified notes and 
chronologies from JCS meetings during the crisis, and declassified oral histories� 
Furthermore, this analysis relies heavily on the Miller Center transcripts of the 
presidential recordings� While digesting the voluminous declassified documents 
presents a challenge, this article focuses on primary sources that reveal how 
the JCS maintained their primary recommendation for military action against 
Cuba� Lastly, my research builds on James G� Hershberg’s “Before ‘The Missiles 
of October’: Did Kennedy Plan a Military Strike against Cuba?,” which deftly 
examines the covert and contingency plans for a U�S� removal of Castro and the 
invasion of Cuba�2 The Cuban missile crisis must be viewed as a Soviet response 
to the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Kennedy administration’s continued efforts 
to remove Castro� Hershberg’s article is key to understanding the normalization 
of military operations and planning among military commanders with respect 
to Cuba� Leading up to the Cuban missile crisis, the Joint Chiefs developed plans 
and conducted exercises aimed at removing Castro from Cuba and overthrowing 
the Communist government� This supports my conclusion that the JCS decision 
to support air strikes was a normal response to the discovery of Soviet missiles in 
Cuba and was in keeping with years of military planning�
The JCS recommendation to conduct air strikes against Cuba was aligned with 
previous Kennedy administration Cuba policies, but ultimately did not take suf-
ficiently into account the political costs of taking such unilateral action� On Oc-
tober 19, 1962, after four days of planning, the JCS argued forcefully to President 
Kennedy in favor of air strikes against Soviet targets in Cuba� But while the JCS 
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worked to implement a military solution to the crisis, the president maximized 
the variables of space and time to achieve a diplomatic solution� After the JCS 
had made their case for air strikes and an invasion to accomplish the removal of 
the Soviet missiles, the successful implementation and execution of the blockade 
demonstrate that solving any complex crisis must be guided by the sought-after 
political outcome, not by which action seems expedient or decisive�
MISSILES IN CUBA AND MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON
Beginning in March 1962, covert U-2 surveillance flights tracked the Soviet 
buildup in Cuba� These Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) flights eventually 
observed surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, missile-armed patrol boats, and 
Soviet-built MiG-21 fighter jets�
When the CIA began flying over Cuba, SAC used a lower-echelon com - 
mand—the 544th Reconnaissance Technical Group’s Research Center, under 
Lieutenant Colonel Eugene F� Tighe Jr�—to study the Cuban intelligence� The 
544th was able to shorten the time necessary to discover possible SAM sites, and 
eventually MRBMs, because it concentrated its initial analysis efforts on loca-
tions described in CIA reports, relying on information passed on from Cuban 
operatives� As director of SAC intelligence, Brigadier General Robert N� Smith 
provided the SAC commander in chief (CINCSAC), General Power, the latest 
assessments on Cuba�3 The 544th’s Cuba assessments were one of the many ways 
SAC monitored worldwide Soviet threats to the U�S� nuclear force�
By late June 1962, “[a]ll-source intelligence”—corroborated by “refugee and 
agent reports, communications intelligence, and the like—had begun to high-
light certain areas as centers of unusual activity�”4 Photo interpreters at the 544th 
observed ground sites prepared in Cuba that matched SA-2 missile sites in the 
Soviet Union� When Tighe had served in West Germany in 1958, he had watched 
the Soviets deploy similar rings of SA-2 sites at Glau, East Germany� The effect 
had been to elevate the risk of reconnaissance flights, and thus to deter U�S� ob-
servation of Soviet missile deployments in East Germany�5
General Power, Brigadier General Smith, and Lieutenant Colonel Tighe 
briefed their assessment of possible missile deployments in Cuba at the Penta-
gon, but the reception in Washington was lukewarm� The National Photographic 
Interpretation Center (NPIC), the CIA, and the Air Staff discounted SAC’s 
assessment�6 Not until late August did further photo intelligence reveal roads 
with “the characteristic ‘star of David’ pattern associated with the SA-2�”7 Tighe’s 
assessment jibed with a memo from CIA director John A� McCone to President 
Kennedy that interpreted the SAM deployments as predecessors to offensive 
missile deployments�8 A preponderance of evidence pointed to the presence of 
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offensive weapons in Cuba, which President Kennedy publicly stated would be 
intolerable for U�S� national security�9
On the afternoon of October 14, 1962, SAC and the 544th used the tracker-
camera film from a U-2 overflight of Cuba to confirm the presence of Soviet 
MRBMs� When the JCS convened for a three-hour meeting at 2:00 PM (EST) 
on Monday, October 15, 1962, the meeting content suggests that SAC relayed 
its assessment of the U-2 flight photography� This put events in motion at the 
Pentagon a day before NPIC director Arthur C� Lundahl briefed the president on 
October 16, relying on analysis of the higher-resolution main-camera film� On 
Monday evening, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) informed the Pentagon 
that the October 14 U-2 flight revealed “cylindrical objects that equated to 700 
or 1100 nautical mile ballistic missiles in the Pinar del Rio area west of Havana�”10 
Yet despite the DIA information, the JCS did not meet until the next day, at 10:00 
AM, Tuesday, October 16�11
While mention of SAC’s assessment of the tracker film is absent from the JCS 
meeting notes of October 15, the Pentagon thereafter planned and operated as if 
the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba had been confirmed� Defense Secretary 
Robert S� McNamara summarized as follows: “[The] President wants no military 
action within the next three months, but he can’t be sure, as he does not control 
events� For instance, aerial photos made available this morning show 68 boxes on 
ships that are not believed to be Il-28s and cannot be identified�”12 The meeting 
discussed the long lead times for the troop movements necessary to prepare an 
invasion force, and McNamara cited the Suez crisis, stating, “We can’t do what the 
British and French did over Suez—say we will take action, then do nothing while 
a long buildup is completed� We can’t do nothing during the 18-day preparatory 
period for OPLAN 314 while the enemy prepares and world pressure mounts�”13 
The meeting notes are sparse for a three-hour meeting, but the JCS decided that 
Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command should provide a re-
port on the air defense of the southeastern United States, along with estimates of 
casualties and damage from an air strike from Cuba�
Additionally, the JCS requested that Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command 
(CINCLANT) revise OPLANs 314 and 316�14 On October 15, 1962, the JCS 
directed revisions to invasion plans for Cuba before NPIC had interpreted the 
preliminary results of the October 14 U-2 flight�15 Thus, even before the presence 
of MRBMs was confirmed, the Pentagon already had begun to address the delays 
inherent in the existing military plans and to prepare revised and additional mili-
tary options to respond to Soviet missiles in Cuba�16
The chiefs were decidedly hawkish on the next actions the United States 
should take� At 7:30 AM on October 16, DIA director Lieutenant General Joseph 
F� Carroll briefed Secretary McNamara on the ballistic missiles found near San 
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Cristóbal�17 At the 10:00 AM meeting, the DIA briefed the Joint Chiefs that three 
MRBM sites could be operational within twenty-four hours�18 The Chief of Staff 
of the Army (CSA), General Earle G� Wheeler, favored a surprise air strike, fol-
lowed by invasion, and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral George 
W� Anderson, concurred� General William F� McKee, the Vice Chief of Staff of 
the Air Force, dissented only slightly, believing that an invasion was not necessary 
on top of air strikes and a naval blockade, and the Chairman of the JCS (CJCS), 
General Maxwell Taylor, agreed� The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), 
General David M� Shoup, recommended that the United States give the Soviets 
an ultimatum to remove the missiles, or the United States would eliminate them� 
The meeting concluded with the JCS agreeing that the first step should be to 
recommend additional intelligence flights, then “surprise attacks on missiles, 
airfields, patrol torpedo [i�e�, PT] boats, SAMs, and tanks; concurrently reinforce 
Guantanamo, [and] prepare to initiate an invasion�”19 General Taylor took these 
recommendations to the first meeting of the Executive Committee of the Na-
tional Security Council (ExComm)�20
At 4:30 PM on October 16, General Taylor summarized the first ExComm 
meeting to the Joint Chiefs and select subordinates, including General Power 
(CINCSAC); General Walter Sweeney, Commander, Tactical Air Command; and 
Admiral Robert L� Dennison, CINCLANT� Taylor highlighted the perspective of 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who viewed the Soviet move to place missiles in 
Cuba as a measure to further Khrushchev’s objectives in Berlin� McNamara laid 
out three courses of action: he classified political moves as useless; he weighed the 
possibility of open surveillance and a blockade; and he supposed that an all-out 
military action could trigger a Soviet response�21
Out of this meeting, the Joint Chiefs cautiously agreed that low-level recon-
naissance flights did not recommend themselves as a course of action, since the 
effort could appear to be an attack� Intent on eliminating any Soviet threat on 
Cuba, the JCS decided it was not advisable to attack only the MRBM sites, leaving 
Soviet aircraft, SAMs, patrol boats, and tanks untouched�22 Thus, while the JCS 
were careful not to take actions, such as low-level flights, that could be mistaken 
as a prelude to invasion, they agreed that any action taken should be decisive: a 
large strike, against all Soviet forces�23
At the October 16 evening ExComm meeting, Taylor echoed his morning 
position and took an approach in favor of gaining more intelligence, to build 
time for a decision� “Our recommendation would be to get complete intelligence, 
get all the photography we need, the next two or three days, no, no hurry in our 
book� Then look at this target system� If it really threatens the United States, 
then take it right out [with a] hard crack�”24 Taylor reiterated the stance the Joint 
Chiefs had taken that morning, during the 10:00 AM meeting at the Pentagon�25 
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This desire by General Taylor and the Joint Chiefs for more intelligence gave the 
Pentagon additional time to refine military plans, thus delaying any immediate 
decision that would reveal U�S� knowledge of the missile sites� On the basis of 
McNamara’s and Taylor’s guidance, the JCS prepared to conduct the defense of 
the United States and contingency air strikes against Cuba� The lead time for a 
possible air strike allowed President Kennedy additional time to contemplate the 
consequences of air strikes on Cuba and the possible Soviet response�
On the morning of Wednesday, October 17, President Kennedy met with West 
German foreign minister Gerhard F� Schröder� They discussed recent develop-
ments in Berlin with respect to visa initiatives and Soviet intentions to restrict 
movement into Allied zones by West Germans� This conversation between Ken-
nedy and Schröder, occurring as it did early on during the Cuban missile crisis, 
shows that for Kennedy the Soviet measures in Berlin were important political 
considerations, to be factored into the analysis of Khrushchev’s placement of 
missiles in Cuba�
The early planning meetings of McNamara and the JCS focused on surveil-
lance and preparations for either an invasion of or an air strike against Cuba� 
Absent from the JCS meeting notes are any extensive discussions of Soviet mo-
tives or expected follow-on actions by Khrushchev, other than General Taylor’s 
comment that amassing a force for a large-scale invasion of Cuba would tie up 
250,000 U�S� soldiers—“playing Khrushchev’s game�”26 In contrast, Kennedy’s 
meeting with Schröder on October 17 illustrated that the president viewed the 
placement of missiles in Cuba as a political act that held wider implications for 
the Western presence in Berlin� At the October 19 ExComm meeting, the Joint 
Chiefs disagreed with the president that military action against missiles in Cuba 
would lead to a Soviet response in Berlin�27 Yet Kennedy continued consistently 
to view the placement of missiles in Cuba as part of the Soviets’ wider Cold War 
engagement with the United States�28
The Joint Chiefs reconvened at the Pentagon at 10:00 AM on October 17, 1962� 
Overnight the staff had prepared sortie estimates based on McNamara’s five 
courses of action for air strikes, and had forwarded these estimates to the White 
House� Yet—in evidence of planning myopia—the estimates did not account for 
support missions related to the air strikes, including “escort, suppression of air 
defenses, and post-strike reconnaissance�” General Taylor chastised the staff, 
proclaiming, “What! These figures were reported to the White House� You are 
defeating yourselves with your own cleverness, gentlemen�”29 Nonetheless, the 
Joint Staff had sidestepped the chairman� Whether the staff did this intentionally 
or through ineptitude, the result was the same: from there the sortie estimates 
subsequently climbed, increasing the projected scale of an air strike against Cuba� 
Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs remained adamant that it would be pure folly to 
Autumn2018Review.indb   96 8/6/18   8:49 AM
6
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 4, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/7
 M A RT I N S  9 7
strike only the MRBM sites� The staff subsequently (on October 17) produced a 
memorandum to McNamara “advocating air attack against all missile sites, all 
combat aircraft, and nuclear storage, combat ships, tanks, and other appropriate 
military targets in Cuba, in conjunction with a complete blockade � � � and advis-
ing that the elimination of the Castro regime would require an invasion, prefer-
ably under OPLAN 314�”30
On October 17, an internal study that examined Soviet intentions contributed 
to the military leadership’s entrenchment in its position that air strikes were 
necessary� The Joint Strategic Survey Council (JSSC), a planning body under the 
Joint Staff, concluded that “the USSR would not resort to general war in direct 
response to U�S� military action against Cuba, that the most likely Soviet reac-
tions would be at sea, against Iran or an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] 
‘accident’ on the Pacific Test Site, and that sharp and strong encroaching actions 
at Berlin, short of direct seizure, could reasonably be expected�”31 General Taylor 
debriefed the chiefs on the Wednesday morning meeting at the White House 
with personnel from the State and Defense Departments—Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk, Under Secretary of State George W� Ball, Ambassador at Large for 
Soviet Affairs Llewellyn E� Thompson, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for In-
ternational Security Affairs Paul H� Nitze—along with Attorney General Robert 
Kennedy� General Taylor relayed State’s preference for political measures—which 
would minimize damage to alliances—including perhaps a summit meeting 
with Khrushchev� At the State Department meeting the feeling had been that a 
blockade necessitated a wider war, and was considered as an additional step only 
by those who did not feel air strikes alone were enough to eliminate the threat of 
Soviet missiles in Cuba�32 By the 17th, internal memos and external meetings had 
reinforced the Joint Chiefs’ views that air strikes were the primary action neces-
sary in Cuba, and that Russian reactions to such strikes would be confined to the 
periphery and incidental to main U�S� interests�
From October 16 to 19, the JCS consistently advocated for some form of air 
strikes and prepared for an invasion of Cuba� On the 18th, U-2 photos revealed 
MRBM sites at Guanajay, San Julian, San Cristóbal, and Santa Cruz� At the 9:00 
AM JCS meeting that day, General Taylor aligned with the chiefs in support of air 
strikes and an invasion� He outlined to the JCS three plans that the ExComm was 
considering: “(1) maximum political effort; (2) a combination, with military ef-
fort being built around blockade, then reconnaissance; (3) no political discussion, 
air strike followed by invasion�”33 The CJCS reported that the Secretary of State 
had proposed a period of discussions with the United Nations, the Organization 
of American States, and Khrushchev, thereafter proceeding to a blockade “and 
state of war�”34 After three days of planning, General LeMay expressed frustration 
at the hesitation to commit to a military solution, saying, “Are we really going 
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to do anything except talk?” On the basis of the October 17 meetings, General 
Taylor outlined the likely approach, suggesting that there would be a political 
overture and warning, followed by a blockade, air strike, and invasion, starting 
sometime the next week� The earliest date an air strike could be ready was Octo-
ber 21, with the optimum date being October 23, followed by an early invasion 
on October 28, but optimally on October 30, 1962�35
At the October 18 meeting, Taylor directed that planning efforts should con-
tinue to examine a “total blockade, selective blockade, and the necessity for a 
declaration of war�”36 This direction did not precipitate a lightbulb moment of 
clarity for the Joint Chiefs, with General LeMay responding negatively to the 
blockade proposal: “It would be pure disaster to try that�”37 Taylor told the JCS 
that the options on the table were either an air strike against all targets, with an 
invasion and blockade possibly to follow, or the aforementioned political action, 
with a blockade to follow� The JCS were due to meet with the president on Friday 
morning, so they codified their recommendations as follows: “(1) Notify [British 
prime minister] Macmillan and possibly [West German chancellor] Adenauer, 
two hours in advance� (2) Carry out a surprise attack on comprehensive targets� 
(3) Reconnaissance surveillance� (4) Complete blockade� (5) Invade Cuba? CSA, 
CSAF [USAF Chief of Staff], and CNO say yes; CJCS says only be prepared to do 
so� (6) Realize there will be a strain upon and NATO problems about Berlin�”38 
McNamara dissented from the Joint Chiefs’ belief that the Soviet deployments 
affected the strategic balance of power, but the chiefs found the presence of Soviet 
missiles in Cuba to be militarily unacceptable�39
“ALMOST AS BAD AS THE APPEASEMENT AT MUNICH”
On October 19, following a 9:00 AM planning session at the Pentagon, the JCS 
drove to the White House for a meeting with the president in the Cabinet Room� 
The CJCS laid out for the president the chiefs’ united position: that the United 
States should attack the missile sites, continue surveillance to watch for other 
sites, then blockade Cuba to prevent additional Soviet weapons from entering� 
Taylor admitted that the JCS had not considered fully the political implica-
tions of this course of action or the “political disabilities” inherent in the JCS 
recommendation�40
For the president, the entire situation was tied directly to Khrushchev’s mo-
tives in Berlin� “When we balance off that our problem is not merely Cuba but 
it is also Berlin and when we recognize the importance of Berlin to Europe, and 
recognize the importance of our allies to us, that’s what made this thing be a di-
lemma for three days� Otherwise our answer would be quite easy�” General Taylor 
agreed with the president, offering that the JCS thought that if the United States 
did not respond in Cuba it would hurt U�S� credibility in Berlin�41
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General LeMay agreed that decisive action in Cuba was necessary to ensure 
U�S� credibility in Berlin, but echoed the JSSC assessment on expected Soviet 
actions in Berlin if the United States should strike or invade Cuba� LeMay dis-
agreed with the president that the Soviets would take Berlin if the United States 
invaded or bombed Cuba� The Air Force general went further: “This blockade 
and political action, I see leading into war� � � � This is almost as bad as the ap-
peasement at Munich� [pause] Because if this blockade comes along, their MIGs 
are going to fly� Their IL-28s are going to fly against us� And we’re just going to 
gradually drift into war�” LeMay and the JCS felt that maintaining a blockade— 
involving large military forces on high states of readiness—ran the risk of ac-
cident and misinterpretation, and closed off the military advantage of surprise� 
LeMay concluded his long statement as follows: “I just don’t see any other solu-
tion except direct military intervention right now.”42
CNO Anderson and CSA Wheeler both agreed with LeMay’s statement� An-
derson acknowledged President Kennedy’s opening statement to the meeting 
regarding the president’s concern over Soviet intentions in Berlin� The CNO as-
serted that the United States must demonstrate resolve in Berlin in conjunction 
with the attack, blockade, and invasion of Cuba: “We recognize the great diffi-
culty of a military solution in Berlin� I think on balance, the taking [of] positive, 
prompt, affirmative action in Berlin demonstrating the confidence, the ability, 
the resolution of the United States on balance, I would judge it, would be to deter 
the Russians from more aggressive acts in Berlin�” Anderson and Wheeler reem-
phasized the JSSC assessments, with Wheeler adding that “from a military point 
of view, the lowest-risk course of action if we’re thinking of protecting the people 
of the United States against a possible strike on us is to go ahead with a surprise 
air strike, the blockade, and invasion because these series of actions progressively 
will give us increasing assurance that we really have got the offensive capability 
of the Cuban-Soviet cornered�”43 Wheeler’s statement of his case to the president 
was effective, appealing as it did to the fact that Khrushchev had not declared 
Cuba a part of the Warsaw Pact, nor had he made an announcement that the 
Soviet Union was establishing a base in Cuba� On this evidence, Wheeler found 
an attack prior to such an announcement to be not only a low-risk maneuver but 
politically advantageous�
CMC Shoup reflected that the American people already lived under the threat 
of a Soviet nuclear strike from Russia, and that adding the capability to strike 
from Cuba was a Soviet move to tie the United States up in its own back yard� 
“And each time you then have to take some action in Berlin, South Vietnam, Ko-
rea, you would be degrading� You’d have to degrade your capability against this 
ever-increasing force in Cuba�”44
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To each of the chiefs, Kennedy agreed or disagreed openly, leading to the 
infamous LeMay-versus-Kennedy exchange in which LeMay told the president, 
“You’re in a pretty bad fix,” and the president responded, “You’re in there with 
me � � � personally�” The president solicited the earliest date an air strike could 
be conducted, and LeMay offered October 21 and 23 as the earliest and optimal 
dates, respectively�45
Before the president concluded the meeting, General Wheeler asked, “Today 
 � � � am I clear that you are addressing yourself as to whether anything at all should 
be done?” President Kennedy replied, “That’s right�” Wheeler followed up, “But 
that if military action is to be taken, you agree with us�” The president replied with 
an affirmative, “Yeah�”46 Thus, Kennedy agreed with the JCS that it might come 
to an air strike and invasion, but he was not going to make that decision yet� That 
afternoon the president remained uncommitted�
Before departing, Kennedy had a private discussion with McNamara, after 
which the Secretary of Defense issued orders to the CJCS to develop fully the 
planning for a blockade and continue to work on the details for an air strike�47 At 
the JCS meeting on the morning of October 19, Anderson had voiced his concern 
regarding the difficulties of conducting a blockade, but after the meeting with the 
president the Joint Chiefs would press ahead with two planning efforts�48
After McNamara and Taylor departed, Wheeler, LeMay, and Shoup continued 
their discussion� There in the Cabinet Room Shoup voiced his final dissent, and 
the secret tape recorder continued to capture their conversation�
SHOUP: You, you pulled the rug right out from under him�
LEMAY: Jesus Christ� What the hell do you mean?
SHOUP: I just agree with that answer, General� I just agree with you a hundred 
percent� He [President Kennedy] finally got around to the word escalation� I 
heard him say escalation� That’s the only goddamn thing that’s in this whole trick� 
It’s been there in Laos; it’s been in every goddamn one [of these crises]� When he 
says escalation, that’s it� If somebody could keep them from doing the goddamn 
thing piece-meal� That’s our problem� You go in there and friggin’ around with 
the missiles� You’re screwed� You go in and frig around with anything else, you’re 
screwed�
LEMAY: That’s right�
SHOUP: You’re screwed, screwed, screwed� And if some goddamn thing some 
way, he could say: “Either do this son of a bitch and do it right, and quit friggin’ 
around�” That was my conclusion� Don’t frig around and go take the missiles 
out�49
The generals agreed that the president equated Berlin with Cuba, and Wheeler 
suggested that, on the basis of Kennedy’s statements, the president was leaning 
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toward political action and a blockade� But the Joint Chiefs had made their case 
for the best military solution to the president, and their recommendations had 
an effect� As the president departed Washington on a campaign trip, he requested 
that McGeorge Bundy, the presidential assistant for national security affairs (i�e�, 
the national security advisor) keep the air-strike option open despite the presi-
dent’s inclination toward a blockade�50
General LeMay’s comments during the meeting with the president were 
pointed� Admiral Anderson and General Wheeler were forthright in their coun-
sel to the president� The JCS had such an effect that the president’s planning 
continued in both directions� At McNamara’s direction, the Pentagon divided 
into two planning teams to explore the details of the blockade and air strikes� 
During the JCS meeting on Saturday, October 20, at 10:00 AM, Admiral Anderson 
“protested to the SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] that this would [be] locking the 
barn door after the horse had been stolen� Blockade would not accomplish the 
objective, was not in the U�S� interest, would be imposed after the missiles had 
been emplaced, and would bring a confrontation with the Soviet Union rather 
than Cuba�”51 So Anderson still thought the blockade alone would not eliminate 
the missiles in Cuba, but nonetheless he directed the Navy planning effort to 
implement a blockade�
JCS meetings continued throughout Saturday, culminating with General 
Taylor’s return to the Pentagon to debrief the afternoon meeting at the White 
House� Announcing that “[t]his was not one of our better days,” Taylor described 
how Rusk, McNamara, and Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson 
had weighed in to support a blockade, to commence twenty-four hours after the 
president’s television address� The Joint Chiefs were to plan for a naval block-
ade against offensive weapons and “be prepared to execute an air strike against 
missiles only, (1) without warning on Monday or Tuesday or (2) after 24 hours’ 
notice�”
Taylor recounted to the JCS in the Pentagon, “The President said to me, ‘I 
know that you and your colleagues are unhappy with the decision, but I trust 
that you will support me in this decision�’ I assured him that we were against the 
decision but would back him completely�” In this statement Taylor appealed to 
the absolute professionalism of the military in the execution of the lawful orders 
of the president of the United States� Kennedy knew that by asking for Taylor’s 
backing he was calling expressly on the Joint Chiefs to execute their duty-bound, 
constitutional obligation or resign� Taylor, in turn, relayed this to the JCS and 
put the matter to rest, effectively telling the Joint Chiefs to get in line� The chiefs 
complied, although Wheeler raised a last flag of protest, stating, “I never thought 
I’d live to see the day when I would want to go to war�”52
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ONLY A BLOCKADE AWAY FROM THERMONUCLEAR WAR
Over the weekend following the Friday, October 19, JCS meeting with the presi-
dent, the Navy continued planning to make the quarantine a reality and the Air 
Force prepared for air strikes� On Sunday morning, President Kennedy met with 
Tactical Air Command’s General Sweeney to review the general’s estimate on the 
likely success of any air strike� The meeting lasted from 11:30 AM to 12:30 PM� 
CIA director John McCone and McNamara agreed that the number of launch-
ers totaled approximately forty, with thirty-six sites known� General Sweeney, 
with the support of General Taylor, maintained that to be effective any air strikes 
against missile sites would have to include sorties against Soviet fighter jets and 
bombers, pushing sortie counts for an air strike up to five hundred� Although on 
Saturday Kennedy had shut down the idea of an air strike, on Sunday morning 
the president reviewed the plan with General Sweeney and directed McNamara 
to be ready to execute such an attack as early as Monday, October 22, if required�53 
Kennedy had to keep the possibility of a direct attack on Cuba poised for execu-
tion should the blockade fail entirely� The JCS and Air Force stood ready to give 
the president military options during the crisis�
Although the meeting was not archived on Kennedy’s secret tape-recording 
system, the ExComm convened again on Sunday, October 21; the meeting lasted 
from 2:30 PM until 4:50 PM�54 In this meeting Admiral Anderson described how 
the blockade would follow “accepted international rules,” and reported that forty 
Navy ships already were in position�55 Anderson further recommended that the 
blockade commence twenty-four hours after the president’s scheduled speech on 
October 22, 1962, to allow the Soviets time to issue instructions to their ships� 
Anderson proposed that if Soviet ships or aircraft took hostile actions, the Navy 
would have permission to respond� McNamara backed the CNO, stating that he 
favored such rules of engagement�56 At the conclusion of the meeting the presi-
dent and CNO had their famous exchange, in which President Kennedy said, 
“Well, Admiral, it looks as though this is up to the Navy,” to which the CNO 
responded, “The Navy will not let you down�”57
That night the Navy worked to answer the concerns regarding the blockade 
(even as the president’s speech was adjusted to use the word “quarantine” instead 
of “blockade”)� Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L� Gilpatric further in-
formed the Navy that the Secretary of Defense required the drawing up of rules 
of engagement regarding the blockade and Guantánamo� The CNO remained 
at the Pentagon until 11:25 PM, finalizing a message to CINCLANT Admiral 
Dennison, for approval by the Secretary of Defense (the Secretary of State had 
approved the message previously)�58 Navy personnel worked through the night, 
and by 7:20 AM had produced a rules-of-engagement document that outlined 
how the Navy would respond to Soviet ships approaching the blockade line�59 The 
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memorandum referenced established Navy procedures and specified that com-
pliant Soviet ships would be diverted to non-Cuban ports� Should a Soviet ship 
not comply, “the blockade would be carried out with minimum use of force�”60 
Late in the evening of October 22, 1962, following President Kennedy’s address 
to the nation, McNamara and Anderson began the process of identifying which 
ship would be the first to be stopped�61
As commencement of the blockade drew closer on October 23, 1963, in a 
10:00 AM ExComm meeting President Kennedy and the ExComm held detailed 
conversations on which ships were likely to be stopped first, with McNamara 
identifying Kimovsk� Further, the Secretary of Defense reviewed possible alter-
natives by which the president could respond if SAMs shot down a U-2� The 
ExComm and the president dug further into the details of the military execution 
of the blockade and the surveillance flights over Cuba�62 Given the risks involved 
if the blockade effort escalated and Kennedy’s interest in the details of military 
procedure, McNamara’s review with the president of the delegation of authority 
to respond to a SAM “shootdown” of a U-2 was understandable�
At the second ExComm meeting that day, at 6:00 PM, the ExComm members 
debated how to handle Soviet ships approaching the quarantine line� Kennedy 
read the quarantine proclamation aloud, going through it point by point� He 
paused in his reading to voice his understanding that if a Soviet ship was hailed 
it would have the option to divert to a non-Cuban port� McNamara followed up: 
“The question is: Can we search a vessel which was proceeding toward Cuba, 
was hailed, requested to stop, did not do so, but turned around and proceeded 
to reverse direction away from Cuba� � � � I don’t believe we should undertake 
such an operation�” To which President Kennedy replied, “Not right now�” Mc-
Namara again agreed with the president, “Not immediately� That’s right� So my 
instruction to the Navy was: Don’t do it�” Attorney General Robert F� Kennedy 
argued in favor of seizing a Soviet ship to obtain further evidence of Soviet mis-
sile shipments to Cuba, and raised the possibility of exploiting the weapons for 
intelligence purposes� Secretary of State Rusk, Robert Kennedy, McNamara, and 
National Security Advisor Bundy debated the merits of seizing ships suspected of 
carrying offensive material� President Kennedy stopped the discussion, forestall-
ing any decision on seizing ships, and returned the focus to editing the proclama-
tion�63 Thus, while the Navy had established rules of engagement on the morning 
of October 22, as late as the evening of October 23 the ExComm still was debating 
tactical-level decisions for conducting the quarantine, while the president edited 
the quarantine proclamation�
Near the end of the October 23 ExComm meeting, President Kennedy asked, 
“Okay, now what do we do tomorrow morning when these eight [Soviet] ves-
sels continue to sail on? We’re all clear about how we handle it?” JCS Chairman 
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General Taylor offered, “Shoot the rudders off of them, don’t you?” McNa-
mara added that he would like to hold off issuing more-specific instructions to 
CINCLANT Admiral Dennison until the morning� The ExComm walked 
through various scenarios, such as whether ships carrying nurses or baby food 
would press through the quarantine� Kennedy found none of the scenarios in 
which ships continued beyond the quarantine line acceptable� The president real-
ized the difficulties and joked, “I’ll tell you, for those who considered the block-
ade course to be the easy way, I told them not to do it!” The president received a 
loud outburst of laughter from around the room�64
Ultimately, the possibility that bothered the president was a tactical engage-
ment in which USN sailors forcibly boarded a Soviet ship, then got killed by 
machine-gun fire� The ExComm did not have an easy answer for the president, 
so finally General Taylor offered, “I think we just have to say, Mr� President, [to 
use] a mission type of order: to use the minimum force required to cause—” The 
president stopped Taylor: “Well, except that doesn’t give them quite� � � � I think 
this is the point� If he disables a ship and they’re eight hundred miles out and 
they refuse to let us aboard, I don’t think we ought, he ought to feel that he has to 
board that thing in order to carry out our orders�” Taylor responded, “Well, he’s 
to keep the ships from going into Cuba, that’s his basic mission now�” Kennedy 
drilled further down into the quarantine procedures: “I think at the beginning it 
would be better if this situation happened, to let that boat lie there disabled for a 
day or so, not to try and board it and have them [unclear] with machine gunning 
with thirty to forty people killed on each side�”65
Whether Kennedy was thinking back to his own service in the Navy and the 
life-and-death decisions a commander faced, or he simply sought to minimize 
the chance that an escalation of force would spiral out of control, the effect was 
the same� The ExComm and McNamara did not press the president any further 
on his guidance�
McNamara briefed Kennedy on suspected submarine movements and Ken-
nedy communicated his concern for the survivability of the carriers Enterprise 
and Independence� Assured by Taylor that the Navy could track the Soviet 
submarines reasonably well, the president closed the tactical discussion on the 
quarantine as follows: “All right� Well, Mr� Secretary, I think I’d like to make sure 
that you have reviewed these instructions that go out to the Navy, having in mind 
this conversation that we’ve just had�” McNamara replied, “I have, and I will do 
so again tonight, Mr� President�”66 Following the ExComm meeting, McNamara 
and Gilpatric returned to the Pentagon and directed the Navy to set up a meeting 
in Flag Plot to discuss the first Soviet ship intercept� The discussion on Russian 
submarines must have had an effect on President Kennedy, because at 7:35 PM 
the White House phoned the duty officer at the Pentagon and directed the Navy 
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to “put a hold on any depth charge attacks on submarines for 48 hours�” The duty 
officer later logged that McNamara phoned the President at 10:00 PM for clari-
fication on the depth charge order, and McNamara obtained permission to use 
“noise type” depth charges against Soviet submarines to cause them to surface�67 
Thus, with the blockade less than a day away, the White House and Department 
of Defense still were finalizing guidance to the Navy�
The different accounts of the Flag Plot meeting between CNO Admiral Ander-
son and Secretary of Defense McNamara are incongruent in several particulars� 
The Secretary of Defense’s oral history from 1986 recounted a long tirade by 
McNamara emphasizing the blockade’s political nature to Admiral Anderson�68 
A more balanced investigation into the meeting (which was actually held in Intel-
ligence Plot) depicted a calmer encounter, with the meeting focused on suspected 
Soviet submarine positions and the Secretary of Defense directing Navy ships to 
positions intended to force the interdiction of specific Soviet ships on October 
24�69 Following the meeting in Intelligence Plot, the CNO returned to Flag Plot 
and relayed McNamara’s orders to CINCLANT Admiral Dennison, determining 
which Navy ships would intercept Kimovsk, Gagarin, and Poltava�70
Reviewing McNamara’s account in light of the ExComm transcripts and 
recordings from October 23 reveals that, while President Kennedy asked the 
Secretary of Defense to review the quarantine procedures with the Navy, Mc-
Namara missed the president’s ultimate concerns� Kennedy understood that 
the Navy had to stop the Soviet vessels if they breached the quarantine line� 
The CNO met with the ExComm on Sunday, October 21, and explained the 
procedures, and had codified them into rules of engagement by the morning of 
October 22� The president’s message—which McNamara did not convey—was 
the president’s fear of escalation if the Navy had to board a Soviet ship� If all the 
previous week’s planning is reduced to McNamara’s supposed statement, ac-
cording to his account—“There will be no firing of any kind at that Soviet ship 
without my personal authority”—it means that his direction ran counter to the 
president’s intent�71 Earlier in the interview, McNamara stated, “We established 
the quarantine, not particularly to stop the Soviet ships, but to convey as force-
fully as possible the political message�”72 Yet despite McNamara’s recollection, the 
actual concerns that the ExComm and the president explicitly expressed on the 
evening of October 23 concerned the political disaster that would ensue if Soviet 
ships with offensive weapons were allowed to proceed through the quarantine 
line� The ExComm meeting centered on ensuring that the Navy was prepared to 
stop the Soviet vessels�
While the Secretary of Defense’s oral history makes for a great “sea story,” the 
presidential recordings of the ExComm meetings reveal a nuanced understand-
ing of the difficulties the Navy could anticipate in upholding the quarantine� In 
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the end, neither the Navy nor the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Anderson, 
let the president down�
On October 24, at the 10:00 AM ExComm meeting, CIA director McCone re-
ceived a message from the Office of Naval Intelligence that Poltava, Gagarin, 
Kimovsk, Dolmatovo, Moscow Festival, and Metallurg Kursk either had stopped 
or had changed direction�73 Thus, the quarantine had the desired tactical effect: 
it turned around the Soviet ships inbound to Cuba�
After the initial quarantine standoff, diplomacy continued, as did the threat of 
all-out war� The crisis was not resolved until Sunday, October 28, 1962, with Ra-
dio Moscow’s broadcast and Khrushchev’s letter to Kennedy agreeing to remove 
the missiles from Cuba in return for the United States pledging not to invade the 
Communist island�74
Sheldon M� Stern’s The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myth versus 
Reality compares secondary literature and primary-source recollections on the 
Cuban missile crisis with the presidential recordings� The analysis reveals that 
the participants shaped the lessons they drew from the Cuban missile crisis so as 
to align themselves with the ultimate outcome: a political resolution to a Soviet 
nuclear missile deployment ninety miles from the United States�
The simplistic narrative of the Cuban missile crisis painted the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff in a dogmatically warmongering light� McNamara’s oral history cast Admi-
ral Anderson as a naval officer who would have preferred to blow the Soviets out 
of the water at first light� The truth is just not that simple� Both Stern’s work and 
any review of the ExComm recordings reveal that nearly every member of the 
ExComm shifted his views on supporting an air strike or establishing a blockade� 
The only consistent member of the ExComm was President Kennedy, who sought 
room to maneuver and delayed making a decision, and whose overriding concern 
was avoiding a path that would lead to all-out war�
The Joint Chiefs, on the other hand, had decades of institutional knowledge 
and military planning behind them when they gave President Kennedy their 
recommendation for air strikes and a subsequent invasion of Cuba� Presented 
with a military problem, the Department of Defense returned a military solu-
tion� Kennedy finally opted for the quarantine, keeping the air strikes as an op-
tion depending on the Soviet response to the quarantine� The Air Force placed 
its bombers on alert and the Navy readied the Atlantic Fleet� The Joint Chiefs 
disagreed with the president’s quarantine decision, but they executed his orders 
faithfully and expertly� Furthermore, the chiefs understood that if the quarantine 
failed, the military could be called on to execute the air strikes and an invasion� 
Experience uniquely informs decisions, and the military experience of the Joint 
Chiefs informed their decisions and actions during the Cuban missile crisis�
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Military and political leaders are forged in the organizational culture and by 
the personal experiences of their careers� The JCS remained entrenched in their 
initial assessment and provided a military option to end the Cuban missile cri-
sis� Their assessment of the larger political crisis and possible Soviet reactions 
to an air strike differed from President Kennedy’s� As commander in chief, the 
president cast the deciding vote, after careful consideration of his subordinates’ 
opinions� President Kennedy weighed the resolution of conflict against the cost 
of war with the Soviet Union�
The outcome of the Cuban missile crisis was that a Communist dictatorship 
became entrenched in Cuba� But as politically abhorrent to the Kennedys (and 
many later U�S� presidents) as Castro proved to be, after the crisis Cuba failed to 
prove itself to be an existential threat to the United States� Yet until the resolution 
of the missile crisis, Castro’s removal was considered�
The president always will have a military solution available, and the quar-
antine, by any definition, was a military operation against Soviet shipping� 
Perhaps one of the many lessons of the Cuban missile crisis is that the military 
is the sharpest tool of diplomacy� Yet military operations must be conducted 
with clearly defined objectives, and military solutions should serve as options to 
achieve those objectives—and as deterrents, to ensure the continuation of politi-
cal discourse and diplomacy�
The implicit trust underlying military service, which includes the inherent 
possibility of sacrifice, is that when sailors, Marines, soldiers, and airmen are 
called on to defend the nation, their lives will not be treated as merely an ex-
pedient solution, without recourse to thoughtful diplomacy� “The Navy”—and 
the Department of Defense—“will not let you down�” But when dealing with a 
dictator—whether in Russia, North Korea, or Syria—our elected leaders must 
take the long view when balancing the achievement of political objectives against 
the cost of military action�
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